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Rarely has the outlook for the Chinese economy been so contest-
ed. Th  e ﬁ  nancial press widely quotes three alternative perspec-
tives on the short- and medium-term outlook. One school 
argues that the Chinese government’s recent eﬀ  orts to rein in 
overly rapid growth are working and that the economy is now on 
a glide path to what is referred to as a soft landing. While “soft 
landing” is usually not fully deﬁ  ned, its chief feature in this case 
is that Chinese economic growth slows modestly from its current 
pace of 9 to 10 percent to around 8 percent and that the rate of 
job creation does not slow enough to constitute a major political 
challenge for the regime. At the other end of the spectrum is 
the hard landing school, which argues that the authorities to 
date have not tightened suﬃ   ciently, that loan and investment 
growth remain excessive, and that the authorities soon will be 
forced to take more drastic action that will trigger a sharp correc-
tion. Finally, the no landing school argues that China’s eﬀ  orts 
to slow growth modestly are misguided since the economy was 
not overheating in 2003 and early 2004. In this view, China is 
in the early stages of a secular boom that has several additional 
years to run.
Th   e soft landing school is clearly the consensus view. Adher-
ents of this school of thought point out that broad monetary 
aggregates and bank lending have both slowed signiﬁ  cantly from 
the breakneck pace of 2003 and the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2004. By 
September 2004, the growth of broad money and bank loans 
both slowed to 14 percent, well below the peak levels of over 20 
percent in mid-2003. And GDP growth, which was 9.3 percent 
in 2003 and 9.8 percent in 2004Q1, slowed to 9.6 percent in the 
second quarter and 9.1 percent in the third quarter (National 
Bureau of Statistics 2004). Many observers have thus concluded 
that China’s desired soft landing is almost here. Moreover, the 
Chinese authorities engineered this outcome without increasing 
interest rates (the modest adjustment of interest rates was not 
made until late October 2004) or altering the exchange rate—
relying instead on administrative controls on bank lending, 
new investment projects, and land use. Concerns about a hard 
landing, with its potentially large, negative spillover eﬀ  ects for 
China’s regional and global trading partners, seemingly should 
therefore be cast aside. 
Not so fast, we say. China’s economic history over the past 
20 years ﬁ  ts better with a “long landing” view of the slowdown. 
At the heart of imbalances in the Chinese economy is an unsus-
tainable investment boom that has been in the making for at 
least four years and that will probably take at least several years 
to undo, even with good policies. Judging from the unwind-
ing of China’s last investment boom, the most likely outcome 
is that economic growth will decline during this adjustment 
period—probably on the order of 4 to 5 percentage points 
from its current rate. Hence, the growth decline will last longer 
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and may be more gradual than advocates of the hard landing 
school have envisaged, but its cumulative magnitude may not 
be much less marked. 
Just as important, until the investment overhang is elimi-
nated, the rest of the world will have to live with a China 
that is signiﬁ  cantly less of a global growth pole than in recent 
years. China alone accounted for one-ﬁ   fth of global trade 
expansion between 2000 and 2003. Th  e expansionary eﬀ  ect 
on the global economy was particularly evident in Asia, where 
China accounted for a large share of the growth of exports. 
But China’s growing appetite for soybeans, copper, and iron 
ore contributed signiﬁ  cantly to economic expansion elsewhere 
as well, notably in Chile and Brazil. 
On the policy side, we doubt that China can continue to 
rely primarily on administrative controls to manage the pace 
and composition of economic activity. Instead, adjustments in 
the renminbi exchange rate and more meaningful adjustments 
in interest rates than we have seen to date will need to assume 
the lion’s share of macroeconomic management and of restor-
ing external balance. 
EXPERIENCE WITH EARLIER INVESTMENT 
BOOMS
Figure 1 presents capital investment as a share of GDP 
over the past 25 years. Note that in 2003 the share hit 42 
percent—almost the same as the peak in 1993 during the last 
investment boom. Monthly Chinese data on investment activ-
ity are problematic, but it appears highly likely that ﬁ  xed asset 
investment continued to grow more rapidly than GDP in the 
ﬁ  rst nine months, so the investment share probably has risen 
to the neighborhood of 45 percent.1 Notice in ﬁ  gure 1 that 
whenever the investment share got above 36 to 38 percent 
during the 1979–91 period, it subsequently fell back to the low 
30s. In the more recent 1992–2000 period, one sees a similar 
pattern—albeit with both a higher peak and trough. True, the 
Chinese authorities intervened “earlier” in this current bout of 
overheating. Th   is time they initiated restraining measures after 
ﬁ  ve to six quarters of excessive monetary growth and when 
consumer price inﬂ  ation was only 3 to 4 percent versus 11 
to 12 quarters and an inﬂ  ation of over 20 percent in the last 
cycle. But ﬁ  gure 1 illustrates that tightening measures in this 
cycle start from about the same high investment share. Th  e 
main message is that nothing in the last 25 years of China’s 
economic growth experience suggests that an investment share 
above 38 to 40 percent of GDP is sustainable. 
Figure 2 shows the time pattern of real ﬁ  xed investment 
growth in China over the past decade. From the peak of the 
last cycle, the slowdown took four to six years to complete, 
and real investment growth slowed dramatically during the 
process. Likewise, ﬁ  gure 2 conﬁ  rms that it took four to ﬁ  ve 
years for investment growth to reach the overextended levels 
of 2003–04. Experience therefore indicates that both creat-
ing and unwinding investment booms in China is a multiyear 
phenomenon—not a one- or two-quarter development.
A medium-term decline in investment growth does not 
necessarily mean that economic growth also has to decline. 
Private consumption, government consumption, or net 
exports could grow faster to oﬀ  set an investment slowdown. 
Figure 3 gives oﬃ   cial data on the weights of these compo-
nents in China’s GDP in 2003. Capital investment and private 
consumption dominate, with weights far higher than those 
for government consumption and net exports. Faster growth 
of private consumption, given its high weight, has signiﬁ  cant 
potential to oﬀ  set slowing expansion of investment in order 
to maintain high GDP growth. But when investment growth 
was declining substantially from its 1993 peak, there was no 
sustained, large, upward oﬀ  setting movement in consumption 
(ﬁ  gure 4). Indeed, over the decade the growth of real ﬁ  xed 
investment and of real household consumption are posi-
tively—not negatively—correlated. Th   e same result obtains if 
the sample of years is restricted to those in which investment 
growth slowed. To sustain GDP growth when the growth of 
real investment falls, say, to 7 percent a year, would require 
a dramatic increase in real household consumption over a 
medium-term horizon. We doubt this could occur without 
creating other problems. Korea experienced a credit card–
induced consumption boom, but it recently ended in tears 
when household debt got out of hand, defaults mounted, and 
the credit card companies collapsed. 
Government consumption has less than one-third the 
weight of investment; even doubling the growth of government 
consumption from its recent pace would add only three-quar-
ters of a percentage point to GDP growth. But Chinese authori-
ties have been reluctant to run budget deﬁ  cits beyond a few 
percent of GDP. Using ﬁ  scal pump-priming to counter a short-
term shock induced by the outbreak of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) is one thing; running considerably expanded 
ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits for several years would be quite another. 
1 Oﬃ   cial data show ﬁ  xed asset investment grew by 27.7 percent in nominal 
terms in the ﬁ  rst three quarters. Fixed asset investment prices rose by about 6 
percent over the same period, so growth of ﬁ  xed asset investment in real terms 
was about 20 percent, more than twice the 9.5 percent real growth of the 
economy over the same period. Unless oﬃ   cial data on ﬁ  xed asset investment 
are grossly overstated or the growth of ﬁ  xed asset investment prices is grossly 
understated, the investment share of GDP must have risen in the ﬁ  rst three 
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Figure 1:  Capital investment as a share of GDP, 1979–2003
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Net exports have the smallest weight in GDP. But in the 
last cycle, net exports of goods and services strengthened by 6 
percentage points of GDP between 1993 and 1997, providing 
a signiﬁ  cant boost to the economy (ﬁ  gure 5). Net exports are 
also likely to strengthen with a slowing of the economy from 
its current peak as import growth slows more than export 
growth. But the rest of the world would no doubt bring pres-
sure to bear for a correction if China’s net export balance 
climbed too sharply, particularly since the starting point in 
this cycle is a modest current account surplus rather than the 
modest deﬁ  cit of 1993.
Finally, ﬁ  gure 6 displays real GDP growth during 1992–
2004Q3. From the peak investment share in 1993 to the 
troughs in 1997 and 1999, the growth of real GDP declined 
by 5 and 6 percentage points, respectively. In other words, 
during the unwinding of the last investment boom, the other 
components of spending did not provide a suﬃ   cient oﬀ  set to 
keep GDP growth from declining. Some Western observers 
have argued that the growth rate at the trough probably was 
signiﬁ  cantly lower than is reﬂ  ected in the oﬃ   cial data in ﬁ  gure 
6. In either case, the decline in real GDP growth was substan-
tial—even if it did take four to six years to occur rather than 
a quarter or two.
Is the current cycle likely to be diﬀ  erent? Proponents of 
the no landing school argue that no signiﬁ  cant contraction 
in China’s investment share is necessary. Th   ey argue that the 
sustainable rate of investment is now much higher than it was 
a decade or so ago. Th   ey regard China’s strong upward trend 
in urbanization and industrialization over the past decade as 
important drivers of a rising investment share. Since urbaniza-
tion and industrialization are expected to continue, so too, the 
argument goes, will high investment. But, as shown in ﬁ  gure 
7, industrialization was well under way during the unwinding 
of the last investment boom, when the share of manufactur-
ing and closely related activity was at the very high level of 
48 to 50 percent of GDP. Yet both the investment share and 
overall GDP growth fell during that episode. Industry’s share 
of output in 2003 was 52 percent, not high enough to warrant 
the extraordinarily high share of investment in GDP. 
Urbanization was also well under way during the last 
downturn. One major potential diﬀ  erence from the last cycle 
is that the quality of residential housing in most cities is now 
improving rapidly, primarily because it is increasingly private. 
Consequently, the level of sustainable investment in housing 
might be somewhat higher than the last cycle, when urban 
housing was almost entirely provided by work units and city 
governments. But by 2003, real estate investment as a share 
of GDP had risen sharply for six consecutive years and was 
already half again as high as the previous peak in 1993, suggest-
ing adjustment over the next couple of years is much more 
likely to be on the downside rather than the upside (ﬁ  gure 
8). In short, continued urbanization and industrialization are 
unlikely to make the sustainable rate of investment signiﬁ  -
cantly higher than in the previous cycle. Th   us, we believe that 
the share of investment in GDP needs to fall, despite urban-
ization and industrialization, and that this decline will likely 
lead to a decline in GDP growth over the next several years. 
An analysis of trends in the eﬃ   ciency of investment also 
leads us to believe that China’s sustainable rate of invest-
ment is well below its current level. Barry Bosworth (2004) 
calculated the sustainable investment rate associated with 
alternative future GDP growth rates, based on the observa-
tion that there has been no discernable trend either upward or 
downward in the incremental capital-output ratio during the 
past 10 to 12 years. He concluded that the sustainable invest-
ment share was 30 to 35 percent—far below the present level. 
Finally, neither the 2003 behavior of aggregate bank credit 
(discussed further below) nor the investment excesses in steel, 
aluminum, cement, and real estate suggest to us that banking 
reform has progressed to the point where an investment share 
of 42 percent or more can be invested proﬁ  tably. Th  e  People’s 
Bank of China (2004a) explicitly criticized what it character-
ized as “the blind expansion of seriously low quality, duplicate 
projects” in steel, aluminum, and cement, all likely to lead to 
excess capacity and declining proﬁ  tability. 
A second argument advanced by the advocates of no land-
ing is that while the past behavior of the Chinese economy 
may not indicate that an investment share over 40 percent 
is sustainable, a high and rising investment share is not so 
unusual for other Asian emerging economies during their 
periods of rapid industrialization. We disagree. Yes, Singa-
pore recorded an average investment share above 40 percent 
during 1980–85, but Singapore is a city-state, not a conti-
nental economy. In Taiwan, which has an unparalleled record 
of 8 percent average GDP growth over a 50-year period, the 
ratio of capital investment to GDP never stayed at 30 percent 
or above for more than three consecutive years (Council for 
. . . the most likely outcome is that 
economic growth will decline during this 
adjustment period—probably on the 
order of 4 to 5 percentage points from its 
current rate.NUMBER PB04-7  NOVEMBER 2004
5
Figure 3:  Expenditure shares of GDP, 2003
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2004, p. 65–66.
Figure 4:  Growth of real household consumption expenditure, 1992–2003
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Economic Planning and Development 1997). Even in Korea, 
which followed a more capital-intensive growth path, ﬁ  xed-
asset investment as a share of GDP never reached 40 percent 
(World Bank 2004). More generally, we can ﬁ  nd no examples 
of large developing economies that have attained an invest-
ment share of 40 percent, much less maintained a 40 percent 
or more share for three consecutive years or longer. 
We conclude that the investment share in China will have 
to fall markedly from its present heights. Th  is implies that 
real investment will have to grow more slowly than real GDP 
for several years. While other spending components of GDP 
can perhaps take up some of the slack, it seems unlikely that 
they can expand enough to keep China’s growth close to the 
current 9 percent plus rate. 
DANGERS OF OVERLENDING AND 
OVERCAPACITY
Taking such a medium-term perspective also makes it clear 
why short-term indicators that the economy is cooling should 
not lead to what could be premature celebration and why poli-
cy levers that produce impressive short-term results may not 
do the job over a multiyear period. Consider, for example, the 
growth of total bank lending, which has appropriately been a 
major concern of the monetary and banking authorities since 
the middle of 2003. After increasing at an average annual rate 
of RMB 1.2 trillion in 1998–2001, the increase in bank loans 
outstanding jumped to RMB 1.9 trillion in 2002 (largely 
because of an acceleration of lending in the fourth quarter) 
and then mushroomed to RMB 3.0 trillion in 2003. Th  is 
brought the increase in bank lending relative to GDP to an 
all-time high of 25 percent. 2003 is thus best characterized as 
a full-scale “blowout” of bank credit that could generate large 
future ﬁ  scal losses. Approximately 40 percent of the increase 
in loans during the last credit boom subsequently became 
nonperforming. If, say, a third of the increase in loans from 
2002Q4 through 2004Q1 eventually meets the same fate, the 
losses (about RMB 1.8 trillion) would amount to 15 percent 
of China’s GDP. 
After evidence mounted that bank credit growth was out 
of control, the authorities lowered their target for domestic 
currency credit growth in 2004—but very modestly—to RMB 
2.6 trillion, only 6 percent below the unsatisfactory 2003 
outcome (People’s Bank of China 2004a).2 Th  rough  Septem-
ber 2004, domestic currency loans outstanding increased by 
RMB 1,790 billion, an amount RMB 670 billion less than 
in the same period of 2003 (People’s Bank of China 2004b). 
While the rate of credit growth has been curtailed signiﬁ  cantly 
compared with 2003, the increase in domestic currency credit 
extended in 2004 will almost certainly be the second highest 
ever. It will take additional years of moderating credit growth 
to get the investment share down to a sustainable level. Th  e 
government may wish to spread out the pain of reducing the 
share of investment, but it can do so only at the risk of wasting 
more investment resources. 
As growth slows in the overheated sectors of the econo-
my—steel, aluminum, cement, autos, and some parts of the 
property market—it doesn’t mean there is no longer a problem. 
As we learned during the dot-com bubble in the United States, 
slowing growth is not equivalent to eliminating existing over-
capacity; the latter takes time and typically requires sharply 
lower investment in future years. Growth of automobile sales, 
for instance, slowed from a pace of over 70 percent in 2003 to 
only single digits (year over year) in June and July. By Septem-
ber, sales actually fell by 4 percent compared with September 
2003 (Wonacott 2004). But General Motors and Volkswagen 
alone reportedly plan to increase their capacity to 3 million 
units by 2007—50 percent more than the total market size in 
2003. BMW, Mercedes, Honda, Hyundai, Nissan, Toyota, and 
a few domestic car companies are all in the midst of expanding 
their capacity as well. Unless demand picks up signiﬁ  cantly, 
the industry will have signiﬁ  cant excess capacity and sharply 
declining proﬁ   tability. A similar excess capacity situation 
may emerge in the steel industry. Steel plants currently under 
construction will add 150 million metric tons of capacity to 
the industry, about half of the 310 million ton capacity of the 
industry at year-end 2003 (Yu 2004). 
 In a similar vein, the continued primary reliance on 
At the heart of imbalances in the Chinese 
economy is an unsustainable investment 
boom that has been in the making for at 
least four years and that will probably 
take at least several years to undo. . . .
2 Th   e People’s Bank does not disclose a target for increased foreign cur-
rency–denominated lending. Th   e stock of domestic currency–denominated 
loans increased by RMB 2.77 trillion in 2003; the balance of the RMB 2.99 
trillion increase in total credit was foreign currency–denominated.NUMBER PB04-7  NOVEMBER 2004
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Figure 5:  Net exports of goods and services as a percent of GDP,1991–2003
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administrative controls will entail mounting diﬃ   culties that 
are apt to diminish the eﬀ  ectiveness of those controls over time. 
Provinces and ministries complain that credit controls limit 
their ability to pursue “good” investment opportunities, thus 
reducing growth and job creation. And highly negative real 
deposit rates (discussed below) cause funds to ﬂ  ow into informal, 
unregulated credit markets rather than into the banking system. 
In addition, detailed instructions from Beijing on the pace and 
subsector allocation of bank lending are inconsistent with ongo-
ing eﬀ  orts to reduce state interference in bank lending decisions 
and with plans to privatize two of the four largest state-owned 
banks (including selling strategic stakes to foreign banks). On 
the other hand, if “victory” on overheating were declared soon 
and administrative controls were relaxed, overheating could 
reappear quickly. And administrative controls have no positive 
eﬀ  ect on China’s external imbalance. Indeed, to the extent that 
they reduce overheating, they also slow the growth of imports, 
thus increasing the current account surplus.
LOW INTEREST RATES AND AN UNDERVALUED 
CURRENCY
Administrative controls look even less appealing over the 
medium term because they fail to address two other key 
disequilibriums in the Chinese economy—namely, real inter-
est rates that are too low and a real renminbi exchange rate 
that is still signiﬁ  cantly undervalued. 
As of the summer of 2004, consumer price inﬂ  ation was 
still on the rise, reaching an annual rate of over 5 percent. 
Th  e  inﬂ  ation rate for corporate goods prices was considerably 
higher—over 9 percent. Before the October 2004 rate increase, 
the central bank had ﬁ  xed the nominal interest rate on (one-
year) bank loans at 5.3 percent, so the real interest rate was 
signiﬁ  cantly negative—on the order of 4 percent. A negative 
real interest rate meant that the demand for credit was high, 
complicating the authorities’ drive to slow the growth of lend-
ing. High inﬂ  ation relative to deposit rates also constituted 
a danger to maintaining a healthy growth of bank deposits. 
Since the nominal interest rate on (one-year) deposits was 
only 1.98 percent, savers earned an increasingly negative real 
return, causing deposit growth to slow for the seven consecu-
tive months (year over year) through September 2004. Th  e 
slowdown in deposit growth reﬂ  ected not only a diversion of 
funds into the unregulated lending market but also fueled the 
growth of real estate investment, where prices have been rising 
at double-digit rates in many cities over the past two years (Liu 
and Wang 2004; Hu 2004).
Th  e central bank’s small increase in posted deposit and 
Figure 7:  Manufacturing as a share of GDP, 1989–2003
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lending rates in late October 2004, unless followed by addi-
tional interest rate moves or a large decline in the inﬂ  ation 
rate going forward or both, is unlikely to contribute much to 
a more durable cooling of the economy. Th  e increase repre-
sents a modest shift in the mix of administrative and economic 
measures used to moderate aggregate demand. But the slight 
interest rate move, only 27 basis points for one-year deposits 
and loans, left real rates lower than they were a year ago. 
Th  e continued undervaluation of the renminbi makes 
it diﬃ   cult to increase interest rates more meaningfully and 
achieve medium-term control over excessive bank lending. 
Between early 2002 and late summer 2004, the real, trade-
weighted value of the renminbi depreciated by 8 percent. 
China’s current account surplus in 2003 was more than 3 
percent of GDP. More striking, expectations of a renminbi 
revaluation stoked large inﬂ   ows of portfolio capital and 
substantial unrecorded capital inﬂ  ows so that China’s inter-
national reserves increased by an astonishing $162 billion, or 
11 percent of GDP. Th   at increase in international reserves in 
turn made it more diﬃ   cult for the Chinese monetary authori-
ties to rein in the excessive growth of bank lending and broad 
monetary aggregates. 
In the ﬁ  rst four months of 2004, the overheating of the 
economy was suﬃ     ciently strong to turn the trade balance 
into deﬁ  cit. But as overheating moderated, China recorded 
steadily expanding monthly trade surpluses from May through 
September. A tentative forecast for 2004 is a small current 
account surplus of about 2 percent of GDP. Moreover, while 
the current account surplus will likely be lower than in 2003, 
the capital account surplus is growing rapidly. In the ﬁ  rst half 
of 2004, the recorded capital account surplus was 50 percent 
greater than in the ﬁ  rst half of 2003. Th   us, even though the 
errors and omissions component of the balance of payments 
shifted back to outﬂ  ows after two years of inﬂ  ows, the increase 
in China’s international reserves in the ﬁ  rst half was $67 billion 
(State Administration of Foreign Exchange 2004). 
From the standpoint of promoting adjustment of global 
payments imbalances, particularly correction of the exces-
sively large and rapidly growing US current account deﬁ  cit, an 
appreciation of the renminbi—as a catalyst for wider apprecia-
tion of the currencies of Asian emerging economies—is still 
very much needed. Indeed, predictions for the US current 
account deﬁ  cit in 2004 and in the next several years are now 
more adverse than they were six to nine months ago. All things 
considered, the renminbi is still probably undervalued by 
roughly 15 percent—the lower end of the range we ﬁ  rst esti-
mated a year ago (Goldstein and Lardy 2003a and 2003b).
In the medium run, China needs to move toward greater 
Figure 8:  Real estate investment share of GDP, 1989–2003
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exchange rate ﬂ  exibility so it can obtain greater independence 
for its monetary policy. For example, if China increased inter-
est rates while the renminbi remained undervalued and was 
still tied rigidly to the US dollar, the larger interest-rate diﬀ  er-
ential in favor of Chinese assets could suck in enough capital 
to handicap the objective of tightening monetary policy. 
For all these reasons—to increase the likelihood of a 
durable slowdown in credit and investment and thus overall 
economic expansion, to reduce international payments imbal-
ances, and to provide greater independence for domestic 
monetary policy—we maintain our earlier policy prescription 
that China should opt for a two-stage currency reform. Stage 
one entails three elements: a shift from a unitary peg to the 
dollar to a currency basket, a revaluation of the renminbi (by, 
say, 15 percent) relative to the basket, and a widening of the 
bands (say, to 5 to 7 percent) around the new parity.3 Th  e  exist-
ing controls on capital outﬂ  ows are basically retained. In stage 
two, to be undertaken as China’s banking system is put on a 
stronger footing, China transitions to a “managed ﬂ  oat” for the 
renminbi and opens up its capital account to larger outﬂ  ows. 
To sum up, we are not arguing either that preliminary 
signs of a slowing of Chinese economic activity in recent 
months are unwelcome or that administrative controls have 
been counterproductive. Nor can we estimate with great 
precision the sustainable investment rate or the amount of 
overshooting that could occur once the investment share 
begins to fall. But it appears that the needed unwinding of 
the current investment boom is far from over and that it is 
premature to herald a soft landing. A long landing is the 
more likely outcome.
3  According to the recently published staﬀ   report for the IMF’s 2004 Article 
IV consultation with China, the Chinese authorities expressed concern on the 
one hand that a small initial move of the renminbi in present circumstances 
could exacerbate capital inﬂ  ows. On the other hand, they also expressed 
concern about the impact that a large change in the renminbi might have on 
employment.NUMBER PB04-7  NOVEMBER 2004
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